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8 August 1985

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## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing on CIA Selection Process and Security Approval for Andrew Feinstein, Staff Director, Civil Service Subcommittee/House Post Office, Civil Service Committee

1. On 8 August, I gave a two-hour briefing to Andrew Feinstein, Staff Director, Civil Service Subcommittee/House Post Office, Civil Service Committee. Feinstein initially requested a briefing on the CIA personnel selection process with emphasis on security approval and stated that his committee had jurisdiction over such matters and that he was involved with the "Stilwell Commission". After several telephone conversations, Feinstein revised his request: he sees that personnel security is a hot issue today and he wants to be informed because there is a chance that relevant legislation will eventually be referred to his Committee. As for the Stilwell Commission, he is scheduled to interview one of the participants on 9 August.

2. At the outset of the briefing, I stated that we were willing to talk with him in the context of cooperation because his Committee very likely would deal with legislation on some aspect of personnel security. I clarified that HPSCI had direct jurisdiction over CIA policy and procedures, but we were concerned over personnel security government wide, and over potential legislation and other activity in the wake of recent espionage revelations. I also stated that he should treat the overall briefing as secret and for his background information only. He agreed to check with me prior to making any use of the information.

3. I presented general and anecdotal information and avoided specifics and legal issues lest they come back to haunt us. I gave an overview of the selection process and emphasized CIA's policy of considering the whole person for employment and basing hire/no hire decisions on multi-sourced information. Of particular interest to Feinstein was our use of psychological testing, the initial security indoctrination, security awareness programs and security counseling.

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4. Insofar as CIA personnel security practices, I paraphrased the guidelines published in DCI Directive 1/14. As for our use of psychological testing, I offered general information on the categories of employees who were tested, and on the value of the results in assessing performance potential and suitability. I dispelled him of the notion that it was possible to readily detect a "spy" from the results of a battery of tests.

5. Feinstein said he was satisfied and requested no additional briefings.

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Acting Chief, Liaison Division, OLLV

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